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ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS; THEIR ORIGIN
AND NATURE
DOWER A CLOG ON ALIENATION.
Under the common law prior to the enactment of the statute
of 27 Henry VIII, also called the statute of uses, there was no
method whereby a woman could by her own act bar her right to
dower in her husband's lands.' This circumstance alone made the
alienation of land very difficult and it is small wonder that the
ingenuity of the lawyers early invented a method of getting
around the awkward arrangement. The favorite way was to
convey the land to uses, the consequence being that the wife of
the owner of the beneficial interest would not be entitled to
dower therein and the land was therefore capable of free aliena-
tion. That this was done for the purpose of keeping the land
free from any hindrance to alienation and not for the purpose
of preventing the wife from acquiring property is shown by the
fact that property was usually settled upon her at the time of
the marriage. Of this situation Blackstone says: "At present
I have only to observe that before the making of that statute the
greatest part of the land of England was conveyed to uses, the
property or possession of the soil being vested in one man and the
use of profits thereof in another ;--Now, though a husband had
the use of the lands in absolute fee-simple, yet the wife was not
entitled to any dower therein, he not being seised thereof; where-
fore it became usual, on marriage, to settle by express deed some
special estate to the use of the husband and his wife for their
joint lives, in joint-tenancy, or jointure; which settlement would
be a provision for the wife in case she survived her husband."-
Also, "Upon preconcerted marriages and in estates of consider-
able consequence, tenancy in dower happens very seldom; for the
claim of the wife to her dower at common law diffusing itself too
extensively, it became a great clog to alienation and was other-
wise inconvenient to families. Wherefore-jointures have been
introduced in their stead, as a bar to the claim at common law." 3
'In re Pulling's Estate, 93 Mich. 274, 52 N. W. 1116.
22 Blackstone, 137, Lewis' Edition.
'2 Blackstone, 136, Lewis' Edition.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
JOINTURE BEFORE AND AFTER THE STATUTE.
Before the passage of this statute jointures were merely pro-
visions for the husband and wife for life and for the wife during
marriage and also in case she survived her husband.4 They were
not as yet attempts to bar dower, for as stated above, no claim
of dower was allowed where the husband had only a beneficial
interest in the land. But by virtue of the statute every person
who had the beneficial interest in the land became seised and pos-
sessed of the soil itself and his wife would thereby have become
entitled to both the jointure and the dower had it not also pro-
vided that a jointure conforming to the specifications therein set
forth should be a bar to dower.5 But if the jointure did not
conform to the requirements of the statute she was at law entitled
to both, even though the jointure was clearly meant to be in lieu
of dower. Upon this state of facts the courts of equity properly
exercised their jurisdiction to restrain her from claiming both
and to put her to her election as to which she would accept. The
provision which the wife was thus compelled to accept became
known as an equitable jointure.6
EQUITABLE JOINTURES, THEIR ORIGIN AND NATURE.
When jointures came before the courts after the passage of the
statute the question that determined their validity, aside from the
ordinary questions involved in all voluntary transactions, was
whether they conformed to the requirements of the statute. If
they did they constituted a legal bar to dower. If they did not,
there was still the chance that they might be made a bar by the
interposition of a court of equity. In the appeal to the equity
courts, however, the persons applying for their aid stood in the
position of asking them to restrain the dower claimants from
prosecuting their common law rights because of a provision for
the wife which as a conveyance of property was valid, but as a
legal bar to dower was a mere nullity.7 Under such circum-
stances the courts of equity rightfully applied in its full rigor
the maxim that "He who seeks equity must do equity," which
in these cases invariably meant that the husband had given the
wife something equally as beneficial to her as her dower rights
42 Blackstone, 137, Lewis' Edition.
':2 Blackstone, 137, Lewis' Edition.
'Logan v. Phillips, i8 Mo. 2 2; Pulling's Estate, supra.
'Washburn on Real Property, 5o8.
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would have been.8 This was done, as clearly appears, not because
the courts of equity then had, or now have, the right to make
contracts for parties but because they then had and now have
the undoubted right and power to require from those seeking
their aid that they shall do towards the adverse party what
conscience requires of them to do. When, however, the trans-
action was not merely a provision by the husband for the wife
but was an agreement between the two entered into before
marriage, the courts upheld it as a contract.9
DOWER BARRED ON THREE GROUNDS.
There were therefore at least three different grounds upon
which ante-nuptial settlements were upheld after the passage of
the statute, to wit: First. Those that were strictly within the
terms of the statute were held to be legal bars to dower; Second.
Those that were not strictly within the terms of the statute but
might nevertheless be considered equally as beneficial to the wife,
were equitable bars to dower; Third. Those that rested upon
the express agreement of the parties were considered valid
contracts and were equally effective to bar dower.
A CONTRACT ONLY?
Are these contracts on the same footing as all contracts, or are
they in a class by themselves the validity of which shall be
determined only according to the rules which the courts of equity
have applied to jointures? It must be confessed that the major-
ity of the courts of this country have leaned strongly to the
latter view, though, as I contend, erroneously. A careful exam-
ination of the origin of these contracts will reveal the error
indicated as well as the principle which ought to govern.
A TECHNICALITY REMOVED.
The reason given by the courts for the rule that a wife could
not by any ante-nuptial arrangement bar her dower rested on
purely technical grounds. These were: First. At common law
no person could bar himself of any right or title to land by
'Murphy v. Murphy, 12 Oh. St. 407; Daniler v. Daniler, I Vern. 724;
Mundy v. Mundy, 2 Ves. Sen. 122.
'Caruthers v. Caruthers, 4 Bro. C. C. 507 (512-513) ; Dyke v. Randell,
2 DeGex, G. & M. 209; Buckinghamshire v. Drury, 2 Eden 69; Tudor's
Cases, 4th Ed., page 12o; Washburn on Real Property, 5o6.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
receiving any collateral thing in satisfaction, unless he had
actually executed a release; Second. Because until married, a
woman could not execute a valid release of property of her con-
templated husband, to which she had till then no title.10 The
statute swept this technicality away, and thereby provided a way
whereby a wife could be barred of her dower, legally, without
her consent, and also a way whereby the wife by her own act
could bar her dower.
DRURY V. DRURY.
One of the earliest cases to come before the courts upon this
question was the case of Drury v. Drury, 2 Eden, 39, and the
appeal thereof, Buckinghamshire v. Drury, 2 Eden, 61. This
case was decided about the year 1762. It was a case where the
wife, a minor at the time, agreed to accept a certain provision
for herself in lieu of dower. Upon the death of her husband she
insisted that being an infant when the agreement was executed
she was not bound by it. The case was finally decided by the
House of Lords. The six judges who gave their opinions to
the House of Lords were not agreed: one view being that the
transaction was a contract and not of such a nature as to bind the
infant; the other view being that the transaction was not a
contract but a provision by the husband for the wife's support,
and as infants were included in the terms of the statute she was
bound. The final decision was that the agreement was a bar to
dower, a provision and not a contract, and the assent of the wife
was held not to be an operative circumstance, though the agree-
ment was signed in the presence of her guardian.
Nearly a century later, in 1852, the case of Dyke v. Randell,
13 Eng. L. & E. Rep. 411, 2 De Gex, M. & G. 209, came
before the courts. In this case, by a marriage settlement made
on the marriage of an adult female it was declared that in con-
sideration of the intended marriage and "for providing a compe-
tent jointure and provision maintenance for the wife and the
issue of the marriage," that the father of the husband had given
him 3,000 pounds, and that the husband had given a bond for
the payment of 2,ooo six months after the marriage, to be settled
on trusts for the benefit of himself and his wife, and the issue
of the marriage. During coverture the husband bought certain
lands, which he subsequently sold to a purchaser through whom
defendant derives title with notice of the settlement. The hus-
'0 Rieger v. Schaible, 115 N. W. 56o, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 866 (Neb.).
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band had become unable to pay the bond, and his widow sought
dower. In this case the Lord Chancellor said:
"It was soon settled that what was not a legal bar might be
made an equitable bar, the ground of this equitable bar being
contract; this did not proceed on any analogy to the legal bar.
As to the authorities they are very few. The rule of the court
is, I think, correctly stated by Lord Alvarley in Caruthers v.
Caruthers, that an adult female may take anything in bar of
dower, that she may take a provision out of the personal estate,
or even a chance in satisfaction for her dower, acting with her
eyes open. This court disregards the nature of the property and
the quantum, and therefore, an equitable bar has none of those
qtialities which attach to a legal bar; it is on contract only, as
laid down by Lord Redesdale in the case of Bermingham v.
Kirwin, 2 Sch. & Lef. 444, where his Lordship observes: 'The
principle then that a wife cannot have both dower and what is
given in lieu of dower being acknowledged at law as well as in
equity, the only question in such cases must be whether the
provision alleged to have been given in satisfaction of dower was
so given or not; if the provision results from contract the
question will be simply whether that was part of the contract.'
If the present were a jointure operating as a bar under the
statute of uses the case would be governed by the 7th section of
that statute, but in equity the bar rests solely on contract, and
my opinion is that in this court if a woman, being of age, accepts
a particular something in satisfaction of dower she must take it
with all its faults, and must look at the contract alone, and cannot
in case of eviction come against any one in possession of the
lands on which otherwise her dower might have attached. This
has nothing to do with the performance of covenants and the
like."
TWO THEORIES.
Here then are two theories; the first regarding the agreement
as a provision, merely, and testing its validity only by equitable
rules; the second regarding the agreement as a contract and
testing its validity by the rules applicable thereto. It is well to
remember, however, that in the case of Drury v. Drury, supra,
it was not necessary to expressly determine whether the agree-
ment was a provision or a contract: it was possible to sustain
it as an equitable jointure, and consequently the question whether
it might have been sustained as a contract was not definitely
reached, though it seems to have been discussed.
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CURRENT VIEW IN UNITED STATES.
I have not found any reason, except the two mentioned above,
why a woman about to be married might not at common law make
such contract relative to her dower rights as she pleased. The
statute of uses swept these away and upon principle dower rights
became the subject of contract the same as other property rights.
In this country the almost universal view has been that the trans-
action is a contract. The case of Naill v. Maurer, 25 Md. 532
(539), states the usual view: "This, however, is not the case
of a settlement or jointure, but of a contract by which the
appellee has expressly relinquished all right to claim any estate
or interest in the property of her deceased husband; a contract
executed in good faith by parties legally competent, and as we
have said sustained by a good consideration. Her power to
bind herself by such a contract, in equity, must be admitted."
EQUITY MAXIMS APPLIED.
When these ante-nuptial contracts came to be considered by
the courts of this country it seems clear that a great many of
them failed to distinguish clearly between what was merely a
contract to be tested by the rules of law and what might have
passed for a jointure under the statute to be tested by the rules
of equity. So they assumed in most cases an equitable jurisdic-
tion to look into the provisions thereof to see if they were
fair and reasonable. If the provision made for the wife was
small in proportion to the means of the husband the contract
was generally set aside on the ground that it was "unconscion-
able." Sometimes these cases arose in a suit by the wife to have
the contract cancelled, and sometimes they arose through an
appeal by the wife from an order of the court having jurisdiction
refusing to assign her dower, or through an appeal by the heir
from an order assigning the wife dower. But whichever way
the case arose, now that the validity at law of an ante-nuptial
contract had been established, the party relying on its validity
was not in the position of asking the aid of a court of equity in
its enforcement, as was the case in the days of the equitable
jointure. The court's jurisdiction was almost always, if not
invariably, invoked by the party resisting its enforcement. Upon
this state of facts, it is submitted that, upon principle, there can
be no room for the application of the maxim "He who seeks
equity must do equity," nor for the corollary that "Equity will
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not lend its aid to the enforcement of an inequitable agreement."
If the party relying on its validity was the one applying to
the courts for their aid in enforcing the contract, these maxims
might apply. But such were not the cases. It is conceived that
even a court of equity cannot relieve a person from his promise
just because he has made an improvident bargain for himself.
When the courts of law, therefore, undertook to inquire into the
reasonableness of the provision made for the wife they not only
departed from legal principles but sought to apply a maxim of
equity where even a court of equity upon principle should not
have applied it. And the courts of equity, likewise, fell into
error when they undertook to invoke these maxims against a
party who was not seeking their aid.1' If every ante-nuptial
contract is invalid where the wife does not receive as much as
she would under the statute such contracts might as well be
dispensed with for their only purpose is to change the provision
made for her by statute.
CONFUSION IN THE BOOKS.
In consequence the books are full of cases of this kind where
the courts have set aside the contract on the ground that the
"consideration is inadequate" or that the contract is "unconscion-
able" or that the contract is not such a one as "the wife ought
to accept" or that the contract is not such a one as a court of
equity ought to enforce."'1 2 A careful reading of many of these
cases will reveal that the contract involved in each was rightfully
set aside because the presumption of fraud which adhered therein
had not been overcome by competent proof, and that the reason
stated by the court for its decision was not the ultimate ground
upon which the case was decided. This leads to much confusion
and uncertainty. Still it is clear that some of these courts have
placed these contracts in a class by themselves and maintain the
right to inquire into their provisions and to declare them void
if their provisions are not fair and reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case.
'Billings v. Montenegro, 70 S. E. 779; Re Devoe's Estate, 84 N. W.
927; Ludwig's Appeal, ioi Pa. St 536; McElroy v. Masterson, 156
Fed. 36.
"Colbert v. Rings, 83 N. E. 276; Tilton v. Tilton, 113 S. W. 134;
Warner v. Warner, 83 N. E. 630; Kline's Estate, 64 Pa. St. 126; 2
Pomeroy Sec. 927.
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COURTS EVOLVING THE PRINCIPLE.
From this original position there has been a tendency to
recede and most courts now place these contracts on the same
footing as other contracts involving fiduciary relationship, where
in principle they belong. If the parties that are about to be
married have a lawful right to make a contract that shall govern
the interest each as a result of the marriage shall have in the
property of the other, then, upon principle, the courts are without
jurisdiction to review their action or unmake their bargain except
for fraud. Courts have in the past exhibited a great deal of
tenderness concerning the relation of a man and woman about
to be married and this may have been in keeping with the
policy of the law when it regarded woman as the weaker vessel
and granted her many safeguards for her protection and denied
her many privileges for the same reason. But now that the law
has given to women full rights the reasoning does not apply.
It is hard to see why courts should be more concerned about this
relation than that of guardian and ward, or trustee and cestui
que trust. In all these relations the parties are allowed to make
contracts to suit themselves though the relationship shifts the
burden of proof to the guardian or the trustee as the case may
be to establish the fairness of the contract. The presumptions
arising in cases of this kind are a sufficient protection for the
party occupying the least favorable position, not even excepting
persons about to be married.
OscAR C. RoNKEN.
RoCHESTER, MINN.
